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Abstract
There is a tradition in science that regards consciousness as merely
epiphenomenal. Accordingly, physical systems can create and influence
consciousness, but consciousness can have no influence on physical sys-
tems. Indeed, the current understanding of quantum mechanics provides
no way for consciousness to alter the wave function of a quantum mechan-
ical state. Furthermore, there is nothing in molecular biology that would
suggest that the human body is anything more that an automaton that
operates on the basis of purely physical and chemical interactive forces.
However, I believe that the epiphenomenal view is fundamentally flawed,
and I suggest the following experiments as a way of demonstrating the
existence of an influence of consciousness on material systems. The first
uses Positron Emission Tomography (PET) with a human subject, and
the second used autoradiography with rats.
Detailed arguments for my position can be found in three papers that
have been published in recent years. A brief summery of the arguments is
initially given below, where it is claimed that ‘pain’ consciousness might
be correlated in a certain way with the relative binding of opiates to
receptors in a subject’s brain.
1. Introduction
In recent papers[1][2][3], I accept the evolutionary argument of William James to
the effect that psychological states must have evolved along with the biological
states[4]. For these two very different kinds of things to have evolved in parallel
with one another (i.e., for one to have anything to do with the other), James says
that there must have been an interaction between the two. Otherwise, wrong
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psychological constructions would not have been selected against, and therefore,
would have improperly survived the evolutionary struggle. If that had been the
case, then any resemblance between the subjective imagery of our species and
the world about us would be completely fortuitous. This argument is given more
fully in ref. 2. It says that the psycho-physical parallelism of von Neumann
must have come about through a natural process in which psychological and
physical states were mutually engaged. Otherwise, one would have to believe
either in Libnitz’s claim of a (miraculous) pre-established harmony between these
two things, or in Bishop Berkeley’s denial that there exists a psycho-physical
parallelism in the first place.
According to von Neumanns interpretation of quantum mechanical measure-
ment, the collapse of the wave function requires the presence of a subjective (i.e.,
conscious) observer[5]. I make use of this idea together with the notion of an
inside observer (initially defined in ref. 1) to show how conscious states arising
within a physical system might conceivably influence the probability amplitude
of quantum mechanical choices made by the system. An inside observer is de-
fined to be a state of conscious awareness that emerges on one component of an
endogenous quantum mechanical superposition of (physiological) states. These
states can be macroscopic in the formalism of quantum mechanics; although, in
deference to environmental entanglement and decoherence, one might call them
“mixtures” instead of “superpositions”. I do not use this language because I
am not concerned here with coherence or interference between macrostate com-
ponents.1
When different inside observers finally do emerge on different components
of a physiological superposition, I propose that there will be a shift in the
relative probability amplitudes of the components that favors certain conscious
states over others. The principles that govern this leaning toward especially
favored states are described below. I assume that the above shift preserves
normalization.2
1Environmentally entangled macrostates really are superpositions. Joos and Zeh say, “...
the interference terms still exist, but they are not there.”[6] This paradoxical statement means
that the system’s phases exist between global states that include non-local correlations con-
necting a macrostate with its environment. These phases are not accessible to a local observer;
and in consequence, the superposition appears locally to be a mixture.[7] But however one
regards such a macrostate ensemble, as a global superposition or as a local mixture, each
component has a probability amplitude in a fully quantum mechanical system. Therefore,
according to von Neumann, a conscious observation is necessary for one of these states to
become a concrete reality.
2I do not say that this shift among probability amplitudes is caused by the appearance
of consciousness, inasmuch as the underlying influence is revealed only as an empirical rela-
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This possibility provides us with an opening in quantum mechanics that
may admit the evolutionary influence envisioned by James. What is needed is
a model of some primitive species at the time of its first use of consciousness,
together with an identification of the kind of conscious experience that can in-
fluence the creature’s evolution by using the above ‘inside observer’ mechanism.
2. My Hypothesis
I believe that the first conscious experiences that appeared in any evolving
species must have been very straightforward, like simple pleasure or pain. Ele-
mental perceptions involving sight, sound, or touch serve no behavioral purpose
in themselves, for they have no intrinsic motivational weight or direction. These
perceptions must be ‘interpreted’ in order to have significance, and that is too
much to expect of the first glimmer of consciousness. In addition, emotions such
as fear, anger, and love have no intrinsic meaning apart from an existing sub-
jective construction of the world toward which they are directed. This means
that an awareness of either one of these emotions requires a greater sophisti-
cation than is required for simple experiences like pleasure or pain. The latter
have a direct ‘unsophisticated’ motivational power that stands apart from any
concept of the external world.3 I therefore develop an evolutionary model that
uses ‘pain’ as a creatures first conscious experience, where pain consciousness
is said to have an influence on the quantum mechanical choices that are made
within the creature. This is done in detail in ref. 2, and refined in ref. 3.
My hypothesis requires that if an endogenous quantum mechanical super-
position develops within a conscious creature in which a more painful compo-
nent competes with a less painful one, than, other things being equal, the less
painful component will have an enhanced probability of surviving a collapse of
the state function. This is the interactive mechanism whereby conscious states
are claimed to influence matter. The model assumes that the more painful
experience is associated with a life-threatening behavior in a way that is best
explained in ref. 3, pp. 1953-4.
An endogenous quantum mechanical superposition develops within the ex-
perimental subjects because the ligands that attach to receptors in the brain
have quantum mechanical wave functions that spread rapidly in space due to
tionship. The existence of various conscious states in the endogenous superposition, plus my
hypothetical change in relative probability amplitudes, plus an accompanying collapse of the
wave function may all result from a ‘common’ unknown cause[8].
3This excludes ‘emotional’ pain. It refers only to ‘physical’ pain (e.g., a flesh wound or a
broken bone)
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the Heisenberg uncertainty principle.4 The spreading takes place as ligands are
swept along in blood and cerebrospinal fluid on their way to the receptor. This
means that there is an intrinsic probability governing the number of ligands that
become attached to the opiate receptors in a pain responsive region of the brain,
thereby posing a quantum mechanical choice between a more painful experience
and a less painful experience. ‘More pain’ and ‘less pain’ are eigenvalues of
the endogenous state reduction.5 In this situation, my hypothesis requires an
increase in the probability of the less painful eigenstate. One would therefore
expect to find a surviving endogenous eigenstate to contain more opiate-like
molecules in a part of the brain that mediates pain, than would be expected
on the basis of biochemical considerations alone. Most measurements of ligand
bonding in humans appear to have been made using subpharmacological doses,
so it is clear that the above hypothesis needs to be tested in vivo using doses
that are large enough to be felt. That is the purpose of these experiments.
Ligands are called agonists if they produce cellular effects within the receptor
to which they are attached. Morphine, fentanyl, and carfentanil are examples of
opiate receptor agonists, inasmuch as they cause cellular disturbances that we
recognize as analgesia and/or euphoria. Other molecules produce no pharmaco-
logical effects when they are attached to receptors. These are called antagonists.
Naloxone and diprenorphine are examples of opiate receptor antagonists. When
a mixture of an agonist and an antagonist is injected into a subject, the two
molecules will compete with on another for attachment to the available recep-
tors. Such a mixture (in sufficient dose) will produce pharmacological effects,
owing to the attached agonist molecules.
The competition between the two substances is expressed quantum mechani-
cally by their appearing in different ratios on different components of the endoge-
nous superposition. Competing components of the superposition will therefore
support competing inside observers who experience different degrees of pain. It
is my claim that the probability amplitudes of these components will be skewed
in favor of the observer experiencing less pain.6
No attempt is made here to determine which agonists and antagonists are
4The term ligand refers to any molecule, endogenous or exogenous, that attaches to a
receptor.
5Another way of saying this is that there is a ‘more pain’ observer, and a ‘less pain’ observer,
who are competing “inside observers” associated with different components of the endogenous
quantum mechanical superposition. The reduction is one that makes a definite choice between
these contenders
6My hypothesis chooses less pain to be favored over more pain for reasons that are best
understood in terms of the evolutionary model developed in refs. 2 and 3.
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best suited for the experiments. Carfentanil and diprenorphine may be ac-
ceptable for the experiment with rats; but the toxicity of carfentanil makes is
unsuitable for use with humans in pharmacological doses. Perhaps fentanyl and
naloxone would be the best combination for humans. However, there may be no
ideal choice of ligands at this time. Background radiation may swamp our an-
ticipated results because of ligand binding that is not sufficiently specific to the
targeted receptors, and/or because of the existence of too many free unbound
ligands. Research is ongoing to find ligands with greater affinity and specificity.
Therefore, although the following experiments may not now give unambiguous
results, they can be thought of as idealized experiments to be performed when
the technology is sufficiently improved.
3. Preliminary to the Experiments
Prior to one of the experiments, the subject who is exposed to painful trauma
should be given a prescribed mixture of an agonist and an antagonist to deter-
mine the size of the dose that brings the subject to the threshold of analgesia.
It is assumed that a threshold dose is small enough that opiate receptors remain
unsaturated throughout the brain, and in fact, that the number of bound recep-
tors in each region remains linear with the number of ligands that are available
to the receptors.
4. The First Experiment
Four PET scans are proposed that will allow a comparison to be made between
the binding of an agonist and an antagonist in the brain of a human suffering
from rheumatoid arthritis (or other chronic pain), or one who is subjected to
cutaneous applications of a pain producing heat (or other inflicted pain). Each
scan begins with an intravenous injection of agonist and antagonist in ratio R.
This ratio is chosen to insure that the number of agonist molecules that become
attached to the receptors is roughly equal to the number of antagonist molecules
that become attached to the receptors. Only one of these substances is labeled
radioactively during a single scan. A scan might reasonably begin 30 minutes
after injection and last for 45 minutes.
In the first scan, the subject is given a threshold dose of hot agonist and cold
antagonist. After the scan, the receptor count/pixel given by CA is recorded
in each ROI (neurological region of interest). In the second scan, the subject
is given a threshold injection of cold agonist, and hot antagonist, which has a
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net weight equal to that of the first injection. After that scan, the receptor
count/pixel, given in this case by CAA, is recorded in each ROI. The total
receptor count/pixel is then C = CA + CAA, and the ratio is
r = CA/CAA (1)
in each ROI. If the test subject is required to endure cutaneous heat, then this
will be applied from the time of injection to the end of the scan.
The first row in fig. 1 represents the population of molecules that occupy
opiate receptors in some ROI in the first scan. The agonist is shown to be
radioactive in the first row (as indicated by the wings), where the number of
endogenous ligands (e.g., endorphins or other peptides) that are competing for
site receptors is indefinite.
The second row of fig. 1 represents the population of molecules that occupy
the opiate receptors in the second scan, where the antagonist molecules are now
radioactive. Combining the first and second scans allows one to measure CA
and CAA in each ROI, and so to find C and r.
The third and fourth scans are identical with the first and second, except
that the doses in this case are subpharmacological. This guarantees that con-
sciousness will have nothing to do with the result. The third and fourth scans
therefore provide values of r for each ROI that are determined by all known
biochemical influences as well as any purely methodological influences. It is my
assumption that
r (pain responsive ROIs in scans one and two) (2)
> r (pain responsive ROIs in scans three and four)
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and that r will be the same in regions that are not pain responsive. The only
thing that distinguishes these two values of r in eq. 2 is the size of the dose,
and biochemically speaking, that should not have anything to with the result.
That’s because the only biochemical influence on the observed value of r is
the competition between the agonist and the antagonist, and dose should not
affect this balance for small doses at steady state equilibrium.7 The inequality
in eq. 2 is therefore a test of my hypothesis concerning the influence of pain
consciousness. It suggests that there are non-biophysical influences operating
in the pain responsive regions of the brain that result in more agonist molecules
being bound to these regions than would otherwise be expected. Presumably,
this is because the conscious observer (i.e., the PET subject) becomes associated
with a collapse of an endogenous wave function that gives preferential weight
to less painful eigenstates. In order to isolate the observer in this experiment,
monitors carrying raw data from the scanner should be covered during the time
of the scan.
5. Distribution in r
The ratio r = CA/CAA is a variable of the total endogenous quantum mechanical
state. C = CA + CAA is another variable, but it is of no interest here.
The pulse appearing on the left in fig. 2 represents the distribution of eigen-
states of r in a region of the brain that is not responsive to pain. These eigenstate
amplitudes will be the same as those predicted by quantum physiology.
In regions that are responsive to the pain, the eigenstates on the right-hand
slope of the left-hand pulse will have proportionally more agonist molecules
than those that are on the left-hand slope, inasmuch as they represent states
having a greater ratio r. So eigenstates on the left-hand slope are more painful
than those on the right-hand slope. Therefore, according to my hypotheses,
the eigenstates on the right-hand slope will grow in amplitude relative to those
on the left. When this process comes to equilibrium, the entire pulse will have
displaced to the right as shown in fig. 2 where its components will be richer in
the analgesic agonist. The measured value of r will therefore be greater in these
regions.
The quantum mechanical state function for the subject’s entire body is a
function of many variables including rA, rB , rC , rD, . . . etc., where these
7Small dose means: on the linear portion of the binding vs concentration curve, far from
saturation[9]. For ligands of normal potency, this should present no difficulty for threshold
doses.
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represent the ratio r in regions A,B,C,D, . . . etc. The total physical state
can therefore be written in the form Ψ(rA, rB, rC , rD, . . . etc.). Presumably the
conscious state of the subject is determined by Ψ in its entirety. The distribution
of r in regions that are not pain responsive will be determined by the quantum
mechanics alone. However, displacements in the functional dependence of r in
all of the regions that are pain responsive will decrease the pain consciousness
of the organism of the whole.
6. Discussion
In pain responsive ROIs, endogenous opioid agonists will generally be secreted
as part of an attempt by the body to alleviate the pain. As a result, the
total number C of exogenous ligands will be decreased in these regions as has
been shown in other studies[10]. However, this decrease will not matter to
the experiment because it is the ratio r of the two injected ligands that is
important. That ratio is governed only by the competition between the two,
and is independent of other secretions. This is one reason why the experiment
is based on the unitless ratio r. A concern is that at pharmacological doses, this
effect will result in a more homogeneous radioactive response over all regions of
the brain, which would tend to mask differences in r.
The experiment will be valid, even if the agonist is specific to, say µ-
receptors, and the antagonist is non-specific, as is the case of carfentanil and
diprenorphine. The ratio r should certainly be affected by variations of speci-
ficity, but it would remain the same between the first two scans and the second
two scans in this experiment. Whatever the value of r for subpharmacological
doses, it should not change (biochemically speaking) as the dose is increased
8
to threshold, even if the ligands engage different populations of receptors. A
concern is that differences in r will be masked by excessive non-specificity.
It will also not matter if the size of the dose is slightly different for different
subjects. A different dose will change the total count C in each ROI, but the
ratio r in each region should not thereby be affected. What is important is
that the dose be one that puts the injected agonist and antagonist molecules
into one-on-one competition with one another at the analgesic threshold of the
subject.
Since it is impossible at this point to estimate the magnitudes of the hy-
pothetical displacement of the pulse in fig. 2, it is impossible to estimate the
number of data points that would be necessary to get good statistics. Resolution
is part of what must be decided by the experiment.
7. The Second Experiment
There is another approach to this problem that involves in vivo autoradiography
with rats experiencing pain. Instead of four PET scans, there are four injections
(in four different rats) of a mixture of agonist and antagonist that follow the
same protocol as before. Each of the four rats is sacrificed. The brain of each
is then sliced and exposed to film to reveal the concentration of labeled ligands
in different parts of the brain.
As in the PET case, the first two doses will allow a determination of r =
CA/CAA in each ROI at threshold levels. The second two doses will allow r
to be determined in each ROI at subpharmacological doses, which insures that
consciousness will not be a factor. My claim is that eq. 2 should also apply in
this case, giving evidence of the influence of consciousness on the outcome.
The second (autoradiographic) experiment might be cheaper and easier than
the first (PET) experiment. But there is one great disadvantage. A negative
result might mean that rats are automatons that have no conscious life. It is only
in a truly in vivo experiment (i.e., one in which the subject is alive and known
to be fully conscious when the data is taken) that the hypothesis can be fully
tested. This requires a PET based experiment that uses human subjects. On
the other hand, a positive result for the second (autoradiographic) experiment
would be useful because it would suggest that rats are conscious, and that my
hypothesis is correct.
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